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Introduction 
 
The effect of the size or scale of a polity on the nature of its democracy and governance 
has been a question for scholars since ancient Greece (Dahl & Tufte, 1973). A recent thread 
within this discourse argues that personalism plays a central role in the politics and governance 
of small states. Most research on democratic theory, including small-state personalism, focuses 
at the level of the sovereign nation-state, but governance occurs concurrently at both more local 
and more international scales. This is particularly relevant given that there are much higher 
numbers of small polities at subnational and local levels, often within large countries like 
Canada, that are not included in research on small states. This paper further explores the 
relationships between size and democracy by assessing the applicability of small state 
personalism theory to subnational jurisdictions. Using Prince Edward Island (PEI) - a  
subnational unit of Canada and that country’s smallest province - as a case study, this research 
attempts to determine whether personalism is strictly a feature of small states and whether it 
might also apply to small polities more generally. My research helps to improve our 
understanding of how democracy functions in jurisdictional scales below the nation-state, 
specifically within subnational polities [i.e. those immediately below the national level such as 
provinces (Canada), states (United States), prefectures (Japan) or departments (France)]. It 
should be noted, however, that the scope of this paper does not include subnational regions or 
local levels of governance such as municipalities, though these may also present a useful 
avenue of research. 
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This paper provides an overview of the literatures on democracy in small states and small 
state personalism theory, followed by a brief discussion of subnational jurisdictions. The paper 
then examines a case study by applying Corbett & Veenendaal’s (2018) model of small state 
personalism to Prince Edward Island. Relying largely on secondary literature and a few primary 
sources, this analysis shows that personalism theory works well to describe politics in the 
province. In the discussion section, I outline some notable aspects of these findings, including 
the potential effect of subnationality on personalism, the potential of personalism theory for 
other subnational jurisdictions, and finally a brief exploration of the potential effect of the stage 
of development and maturity of political institutions. The paper concludes with a brief 
consideration of possible future research directions. 
 
 
Background 
 
Democracy in small states and islands 
 
The relationship between polity size and democracy has long been a question of interest 
for scholars (Dahl & Tufte, 1973; Thorhallsson, 2018; Wettenhall, 2018). However, despite 
modern calls for smaller political units, epitomised by the “small is beautiful” movement 
(Schumacher, 1973), small (mostly island) states have routinely been excluded from analyses 
of democratisation. Veenendaal & Corbett summarise the reasons given for this exclusion as 
“insignificant population size, they are not “real” states, that others exclude them too, the 
absence of data, and the perceived need to compare similar systems” (2015, p. 528). They argue 
that the exemption of 15%-20% of cases (states) is methodologically questionable, especially 
given current trends of states decreasing in size or devolving power to smaller subnational units 
(Veenendall & Corbett, 2015; Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018). Furthermore, for the purposes of 
studies in democratisation and governance, this exclusion is problematic because these small 
states are much more likely to be democratic (Diamond & Tsalik, 1999; Srebrnik, 2004), 
meaning that an important group of cases has been neglected in the literature. Consequently, 
recent research has shown that mainstream democratisation theory, developed exclusively in 
reference to large states, does not apply well to small states, and that significant differences 
between large and small states have been missed. There is thus a need to develop theories to 
explain democratisation that applies specifically to small states (Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018). 
 
 It should also be noted that the question of what qualifies as a ‘small’ state is not 
straightforward and can have different answers, almost all of which are arbitrary. Dahl & Tufte, 
in their pioneering book Size and Democracy (1973), explored several potential variables for 
measuring size, including population, area, population density, economic development 
indicators and geographic characteristics. Since their work, the field has tended to rely on 
population as the primary variable of size (Srebrnik, 2004; Wettenhall, 2018), although some 
have used variations on the number of residents, including combining it with land area (cf. 
Hadenius, 1992). With the current consensus to use population as the measure of size, the 
question then arises as to what differentiates a small population from a large one. A quick scan 
of recent scholarship suggests that the figure of one million is most commonly used (Hadenius, 
1992; Diamond & Tsalik, 1999; Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018), though a range of other 
threshold levels has been suggested (Baldacchino, 2018; Wettenhall, 2018). 
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As first noted by Axel Hadenius (1992), island states are a particularly interesting group 
of cases in that they are significantly more democratic than other states. He claimed that this 
relationship is spurious and that it is rather the strong Protestantism of these islands that explain 
their democratic nature (Hadenius, 1992). This interpretation was challenged by Anckar & 
Anckar (1995) who showed that the correlation between democracy and islandness is improved 
when distinguishing islands based on size; differentiating between large and small island states, 
as opposed to all islands. Thus, both islandness and size appear to be relevant factors associated 
with the level of democracy in a state. 
 
 Critical analysis of these findings, however, has suggested that the relationship between 
small islands and democracy is more complicated than the above statistical analyses suggests. 
When investigating the phenomenon further, scholars have noted that many of these small 
states that are nominally classified as democracies often have political and cultural practices 
that are quite undemocratic. Small-scale societies often create situations of monopoly elite 
control, which leads to nepotism and patronage (Srebrnik, 2004; Buker, 2005). Similarly, 
homogenous and conformist cultures often lead to unitary and authoritarian tendencies, and 
ostracism of non-conformists (Baldacchino, 1997; 2012b). This seemingly unifying force, 
while it might create a sense of solidarity, can also obscure ethnic and cultural cleavages, even 
secessionist movements (Srebrnik, 2004), contributing to an uncritical and “naive mythology 
… [of] harmonious polities” (Baldacchino, 2012b, p. 115).  
 
Small state personalism 
 
To explain the disconnect between the two bodies of evidence outlined above, Erk & 
Veenendaal (2014) point to a reliance on data from Freedom House, the only international 
measure of democracy that includes small states, which “overemphasises the more formal 
aspects of democracy while failing to capture the informal but real power relations and 
pathways of influence that are common in microstates and frequently lead to de facto deviations 
from democracy” (pp. 135-136). Thus, small states generally have formal political structures 
that are democratic, but informal social processes that are undemocratic. As a result of years 
of in-depth qualitative research to better understand these informal aspects of political systems 
in small states, Jack Corbett and Wouter Veenendaal have collated a body of research which 
suggests that democratisation operates differently in large versus small states (2017; 2018; 
Corbett, 2015; 2018; also Veenendaal, 2013; 2015a; 2015b). Large states (populations greater 
than one million) are adequately explained by existing democratic theory focusing on the 
typical variables of economic development, culture, institutions, political parties, and 
geography. However, democratisation in those states of less than one million people is not 
adequately explained by mainstream democratic theories, and therefore requires alternative 
explanations. Corbett and Veenendaal’s (2018) findings lead them to describe a theory of small 
state hyper-personalism, which they argue provides the best explanation for the patterns of 
democratisation in small states. Consistent with the above criticisms of the ‘small is 
democratic’ discourse, they argue that the common characteristic of democracy in small states 
is the “intensely informal, localised and personality-driven” nature of political practice (Corbett 
& Veenendaal, 2018, p. 5). 
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While personalistic politics exist in states of all sizes to some extent, Corbett and 
Veenendaal (2018) argue that a distinct version of personalism is present in small states. Hence, 
they define ‘small state personalism’ based on six dimensions:  
 
● Strong connections between individual leaders and constituents 
● A limited private sphere 
● The limited role of ideology and programmatic policy debate 
● Strong political polarisation 
● The ubiquity of patronage, and 
● The capacity to dominate all aspects of public life. 
The authors make their case by conducting a series of regression analyses on the 
relationships between the level of democracy reported by Freedom House and the variables of 
economic development, cultural diversity, institutional design, political parties, geographic 
factors and size, while also distinguishing between large states and small states. Through this 
analysis, they show that none of these variables explains the differences between large and 
small states. They then present small state personalism as a feature that is “ubiquitous” in these 
states and explain the preponderance of both nominally democratic structures and the anti-
democratic political tendencies of small states (Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018, p. 10).  
 
As noted above, the focus on the analytical scale of the sovereign nation-state has led to 
a gap in the research on democracy in small places. While Corbett and Veenendaal have 
identified personalism as a key defining characteristic of democracy in small states, their work 
leaves out a multitude of other small polities that operate at subnational scales. This paper 
contributes to addressing this gap by attempting to apply small state personalism to the 
subnational level.  
 
Subnational jurisdictions 
 
 In recent decades, there has been increasing pressure within many states to devolve 
authority to subnational or even local levels of government (Diamond & Tsalik, 1999; 
Baldacchino & Milne, 2000; Marks, Hooghe, & Schakel, 2008a; 2008b). Successful devolution 
from the national to subnational level may be exemplified in the creation of the Scottish and 
Welsh parliaments in the United Kingdom; but there are various other examples that could be 
listed, including some unsuccessful or still contested attempts at devolution such as Catalonia, 
Bougainville or Kurdistan. Even in places where significant devolution has been achieved, such 
as Scotland and Canada’s French-speaking province of Québec, pressures for further autonomy 
in the form of sovereignty often remain (Guibernau, Rocher, & Adam, 2014). With this push 
for devolution, along with earlier decolonisation movements, there is a growing number of 
subnational polities that could be characterised as near-sovereign in that they have most of the 
powers of a fully sovereign state but remain dependent in some regard; and many of these are 
small polities (Baker, 1992).  
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Furthermore, self-governing territories, even if they remain dependent to some degree, 
are much more similar to sovereign states than are local and municipal governments, the latter 
having a much more limited range of functional responsibilities (Kersell, 1992). Therefore, 
although I suspect the local government (e.g., municipalty, county, region) level could be an 
interesting and potentially fruitful jurisdictional scale for the study of personalistic politics 
(e.g., Dahl & Tufte, 1973), for the purposes of this paper I will limit my focus to subnational 
polities.  
 
Within subnational polities there is a wide range of self-governance capacities. Work by 
Marks, et al.  (2008a, 2008b) in developing a Regional Authority Index provides a mechanism 
to assess these different levels of autonomy. We might assume that polities scoring higher in 
the Regional Authority Index would have governance systems more akin to those of sovereign 
states. As Corbett & Veenendaal’s personalism theory was developed through analysis of small 
states, the move to apply it to subnational polities with relatively high levels of self-governance 
is the logical first step in testing the application of personalism theory at other scales, and less 
of a stretch of logic than attempting to apply it to polities with low levels of self-governance or 
to local levels of government.  
 
 Canada is a federal state containing two types of subnational jurisdictions: provinces 
and territories. The ten Canadian provinces have populations ranging from 153,000 to over 14 
million persons (Statistics Canada, 2018b). Despite these vastly different population sizes, they 
all have “virtually identical” constitutional arrangements based on the Westminster cabinet-
parliamentary system with only minor variations in their conventions and practices (Thomas 
& White, 2015, p. 364; Rowe & Collins, 2015). In spite of this structural sameness, many 
different political cultures have arisen across the provinces from their unique circumstances 
and historical experiences (Wiseman, 2015). One of the most striking differences between the 
provinces is the unique system of civil law used in Québec, instead of the common law used in 
other provinces; though this system still functions within the same constitutional division of 
powers that applies to all provinces (Hurtubise-Loranger, Lithwick, & Nichol, 2011; Valcke, 
1996). The three Canadian territories, all with populations under 50,000 (Statistics Canada, 
2018b), have some jurisdictional autonomy, but less than the provinces (Hooghe, et al., 2008a). 
According to the Regional Authority Index, the Canadian provinces are highly autonomous 
subnational units relative to other countries (Hooghe, et al., 2008b). 
 
 Subnational polities, and the various ways in which they exercise their jurisdictional 
powers, have been the subject of a significant amount of scholarship, especially within the field 
of island studies. This makes sense, given that many islands are also subnational political units 
(Baldacchino & Stuart, 2008). Significant scholarship has thus centred on the classification of 
the ‘subnational island jurisdiction’ or SNIJ (Baldacchino, 2004). Island scholars have noted 
that many SNIJs have negotiated higher levels of autonomy than other regions in their 
respective states, and then used this increased jurisdictional authority to develop innovative 
political economic strategies that allow them to compete successfully in the modern global 
capitalist system (Baldacchino & Milne, 2000). An examination of the global list of SNIJs 
shows that they are predominantly small polities (Stuart, 2008). This suggests that the potential 
exists for further studies involving and linking SNIJs, small states and small island states. 
Indeed, many scholars have interchangeably varied their unit of analysis between small states, 
islands, small island states, and SNIJs (Briguglio, 1995; Briguglio, et al., 2008; Baldacchino, 
2004; 2012b; 2018). Small SNIJs are therefore some of the most highly autonomous 
subnational polities, and, as I suggest, a potentially fruitful group from which to draw for the 
study of subnational personalism. 
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Personalism on Prince Edward Island 
 
The remainder of this paper explores the feasibility of linking the discourses on small 
states and subnational jurisdictions by applying the theory of small state personalism in a case 
study, namely Prince Edward Island (PEI), an island province of Canada in the North Atlantic. 
With a population of 153,000 (Statistics Canada, 2018b), PEI is Canada’s smallest province 
and clearly qualifies as a small polity. The province’s Legislative Assembly is currently made 
up of 27 members, representing constituencies with an average of 3,700 voters each (Electoral 
Boundaries Commission of Prince Edward Island, 2017). Since the emergence of political 
parties in the province, only two – the Liberal Party and the Progressive Conservative (PC) 
Party (formerly called the Conservative Party) – have ever governed the province and very few 
members from other parties have ever been elected (MacKinnon, 1973; Desserud, 2016). The 
party standing in the Legislature as of the recent election in April 2019, with 12 PCs, 8 Greens, 
6 Liberals, and one seat vacant (later won by the PCs in a deferred election), is the first time 
that a party other than the Liberals or Progressive Conservatives has formed the Official 
Opposition. 
 
Several observers have noted that PEI’s political culture differs markedly from that of 
other Canadian provinces, primarily because of the effects of its small size (Driscoll, 1988; 
Smith, 1988; Buker, 2005; MacKinnon, 2011; McKenna, 2014b), suggesting that the pattern 
of small states diverging from large ones may similarly hold among subnational polities within 
the Canadian federation, thus making the province a potentially fruitful case for study. The 
following subsections will examine PEI politics using Corbett & Veenendaal’s (2018) core 
dimensions of personalism as an analytical framework, relying primarily on secondary 
literature on the politics of PEI. Consequently, the following analysis will focus primarily on 
political practices, rather than structures. 
 
Dimension 1: Strong connections between individual leaders and constituents 
 
This dimension emphasises direct and personal links between politicians and citizens, as 
well as the “role multiplicity” (Baldacchino, 1997) of politicians. Relationships between 
individuals in small-scale societies tend to be “functionally diffuse”, in that there are multiple 
points of contact between people, often in a variety of separate contexts (Benedict, 1967). There 
are thus myriad opportunities for citizens to directly interact with their political representatives, 
without the usual mediation of political parties (Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018). Furthermore, 
smaller-scale politics allows greater access by citizens to senior political leaders, which reduces 
the asymmetries in knowledge, power and information that can emerge in larger more 
hierarchical systems (Dahl & Tufte, 1973). These factors may improve the quality of 
representation: but they may also increase the pervasiveness and influence of political conflicts 
throughout a society (Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018; Benedict, 1967).  
 
A study on the role of Members of the PEI Legislative Assembly (MLAs) found that 
politicians face strong expectations to intervene directly in the day-to-day concerns of their 
constituents, especially with respect to finding employment. They are correspondingly 
expected to be accessible and to meet directly with constituents on a regular basis. This 
sometimes goes to comical extremes, such as the story of an MLA having to rescue a stranded 
cat from the roof of a constituent’s house (Lund, 2009). Another key aspect of this research is 
that it gathered data on other Canadian provinces as well. The comparison between PEI and 
the rest of Canada showed that constituency duties, such as “meeting with or corresponding 
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with individual constituents, attending private functions (such as funerals and birthday parties), 
and helping constituents to access employment” (Lund, 2009, p. 6), occupied a significantly 
larger proportion of PEI MLAs’ time. With 5,378 residents per riding, PEI has a much smaller 
ratio of residents to politician compared to other provinces, where the figure ranges from 
10,973 to 126,573 residents per riding with an average of 38,178 (Thomas & White, 2015). 
One might therefore expect that MLAs would spend less time dealing with constituency duties, 
not more, since they are responsible for far fewer constituents. The greater time spent dealing 
with constituents may reflect a more active relationship between politicians and constituents, 
combined with smaller staff complements and fewer supports for MLAs (Lund, 2009; 
MacKinnon, 2011; Thomas & White, 2015). These and similar concerns about the roles of 
MLAs have been raised (Buker, 2005; MacKinnon, 2011; Simpson, 2007); but politicians have 
so far seemed generally disinclined to move away from the status quo, suggesting that the direct 
personal links between politicians and constituents are still perceived as highly important. 
During a 2017 debate on an opposition motion calling for the establishment of an 
ombudsperson office, government backbench MLA Richard Brown argued in defence of the 
current system: 
 
It’s important that we get to know the issues firsthand from our constituents. I think that’s 
one of the reasons Prince Edward Island is one of the greatest provinces here in Canada 
because [of] our closeness to our constituents … I really feel that [with] an 
ombudsperson, then, that job will be taken away from us because the next thing will be: 
Well, you shouldn’t be helping constituents navigate government. We have an 
ombudsperson for that (Brown, 2017, pp. 1252-1253). 
 
In a recent interview, Charles MacKay, the former long-time Clerk of the Legislative 
Assembly of PEI, noted that this type of access to politicians extends to the highest level: 
 
Here, you could see the Premier at a coffee shop; or the Leader of the Opposition, the 
Leader of the Third Party. They’re all very accessible and would pretty much without 
exception take appointments, if that’s desired (MacKay, 2019). 
 
Role multiplicity is also a common and explicit feature of the political culture on PEI. 
Sitting MLAs who are not members of Cabinet routinely maintain other roles in civil and 
private life beyond their responsibilities as elected representatives, including secondary 
employment and business interests (Wright, 2017; Campbell, 2019). Role multiplicity also 
extends beyond politicians to the broader political elite, in that people connected to political 
parties often sit on multiple boards and commissions (Simpson, 2007). Drawing on PEI as an 
example, Baldacchino points out (2012a; 2012b) that the particularistic and complex networks 
that emerge in small-scale social systems can create conditions that strongly discourage dissent 
and difference. 
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Dimension 2: A limited private sphere 
 
In small states, the scope of what is considered public business is expanded, often beyond 
the formal institutional structures of government, with a correspondent limiting of the private 
sphere. This leads to weaker and more informal government institutions, blurred lines of 
accountability, but at the same time greater transparency. There also tends to be increased 
overlap between public and private activities and relationships, and political allegiances are 
less anonymous: they are often deduced by family names (Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018).  
 
The fact that, as noted above, many PEI politicians maintain second jobs, businesses, and 
other private interests while serving as elected representatives (Wright, 2017), is a conspicuous 
example of the blurring of lines between public and private. Furthermore, as noted by Lund 
(2009), politicians are expected to deal with issues that often fall well outside the typical public 
sphere. This expansion of public reach applies not only to individual politicians but also to the 
provincial government: because of its small size, the executive can maintain a wide scope of 
concern without resorting to institutional and legal constraints (Buker, 2005). Furthermore, 
formal structures of accountability through the legislative branch are weak, leaving 
accountability substantially within the purview of direct politician-citizen relationships 
(MacKinnon, 2011). Whether transparency is improved on PEI because of these factors is 
unclear, though stronger systems of transparency and accountability have been noted as 
possible solutions to concerns about patronage and favouritism (Simpson, 2007). 
 
The boundaries between the public and private sector in PEI are often porous, as 
illustrated by the practice of appointing a significant number of Deputy Ministers (the 
permanent heads of government ministries) from the private sector. Whereas the typical 
practice at the federal level in Canada and in other Westminster governments is to recruit 
permanent heads of ministries almost exclusively from within the public service (Bourgault & 
Dion, 1989; Paun & Harris, 2013), the practice in PEI has been, and remains, to appoint a mix 
of public servants and individuals recruited from outside government (McKenna, 2014a), 
including during the most recent change in government following the 2019 election (Neatby, 
2019).  
 
Dimension 3: The limited role of ideology and programmatic policy debate 
 
Politics in small states tends to focus more on the personalities of leaders than on 
questions of policy, which leads to a lack of ideological differentiation between political 
parties. Rather than institutions for aggregating policy preferences, parties instead become 
vehicles for maintaining networks of patron-client relations (Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018). 
 
The early politics of PEI was often focused on personal rivalries. The rise of the first 
political parties began as factions supporting and opposing the then colony’s governor, Walter 
Patterson, due in part to the usual accusations of profiteering, but also due to an illicit affair 
with the wife of the Chief Justice, making it “perhaps the first political movement in North 
America began in part to revenge an extra-marital relationship" (MacKinnon, 1973, p. 7). Over 
the years, the two parties (precursors to the modern Liberal and Progressive Conservative 
parties) did take opposing stances, often along religious lines, on various issues such as the 
secularisation of schools, prohibition of alcohol, and confederation with Canada. However, the 
primary motivations of politicians may often (if not predominantly) have been securing the 
spoils of power (Buker, 2005), as illustrated by the fact that one party’s constitution at one 
point included a ‘Patronage Committee’ to “keep records of service and contributions of party 
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supporters and shall make recommendations for patronage benefits” (cited in Simpson, 1988, 
p. 165). This example also evidences the formal institutionalisation of patron-client networks. 
Overall, observers note that there is little ideological difference between the two main political 
parties (MacKinnon, 2011; Smith, 1988). A possible explanation for the lack of ideological 
variation in PEI political parties may be found in the results of a 2011 study on the underlying 
values of voters, which found that the provincial electorate has a “uniquely centrist ideological 
structure”, with supporters of the two main political parties showing no significant ideological 
difference (McGrane, 2015, p. 194). All other provinces showed a traditional left-centre-right 
ideological split among voters.  
 
Dimension 4: Strong political polarisation 
 
Rather than mitigating political polarisation, the lack of political platform noted in the 
previous dimension instead acts to focus it on individual politicians and leaders. Rivalries 
between individual politicians are common and can lead to breaking of allegiances, 
fragmentation and unstable governments (Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018). Conversely, this 
polarisation and fragmentation can sometimes lead to increased political stability as power is 
more easily concentrated with individual politicians or elites (Veenendaal, 2018; see also 
Dimension 6, below).  
 
Politics on PEI is commonly described as highly partisan, and in the past this did indeed 
lead to unstable governments (MacKinnon, 1973; MacDonald, 2000; Simpson, 2007). In recent 
decades, governments have been rather stable, with parties generally being in power for three 
to four consecutive terms at a time. However, PEI’s near-perfect two-party system is evidence 
that the system remains polarised; two parties, the Liberal Party and the Progressive 
Conservative Party, have amassed the overwhelming majority of votes in every election, except 
2019. The single-member plurality electoral system (generally called “first-past-the-post”) 
amplifies this polarisation of votes so that small shifts in votes lead to big shifts in seats, 
allowing a substantial concentration of power in the winning party. Because of PEI’s small 
population and small electoral districts, these shifts in votes can be razor-thin; it is often pointed 
out that a shift of 100 votes spread across the 27 electoral districts is enough to award a majority 
to the opposite party (MacKinnon, 2011). This pattern is often locally referred to as PEI’s 
“ping-pong politics” (MacLean, 2019). 
 
As noted above, the most recent election in 2019 saw a potential breakdown of the 
traditional Liberal-PC polarisation. This election returned PEI’s first minority parliament, with 
the Green Party, which had won its first-ever seat in PEI in the previous 2015 election, 
catapulted to Official Opposition status, relegating the Liberals to Third Party. While this could 
indicate a reduction in the polarisation of voters and the development of a three-party system 
(the longevity of the Greens may be the test), it should not be interpreted as an embrace of 
ideology nor a reduction in personalism. As University of Prince Edward Island political 
science professor Don Desserud points out, the charismatic personality of the Green Party’s 
leader, Peter Bevan-Baker, “played an extremely important role” in this result (2019). If 
anything, it reinforces the personal nature of politics in PEI. 
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Dimension 5: The ubiquity of clientelism and patronage 
 
Due in part to many of the dimensions listed above, patronage, clientelism, and nepotism 
are typically ubiquitous in small states. This is seen in the promises and provision of largesse 
(now, often in the form of employment or other favourable treatment) by politicians to 
constituents, and subsequently in expectations from constituents that politicians provide this 
largesse. Patronage networks tend to be simple and direct, relying on face-to-face relationships. 
Small states tend to have large public sectors which are often rife with patronage. Patronage 
and clientelism are also thought to increase voter turnout (Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018). 
 
Patronage has a long and important history in PEI politics. MacDonald (2000, p. 21) 
describes PEI politics in the early twentieth century as a “blood sport. Power was the goal, 
patronage its local expression”. As shown above with one party having a committee 
specifically devoted to maintaining patronage networks, this was quite openly practised. Prior 
to a period of reform from the 1970s to 1990s, it was not just common but expected that 
political parties would buy votes by providing 'treats' in the form of a pint of rum, cash ($5 was 
typical in the early twentieth century), road paving, or promises of jobs or favours (MacKinnon, 
1973; Simpson, 1988). With respect to jobs, the typical pattern was that each time power 
changed from one party to another the incoming administration would proceed with mass 
layoffs of all the previous government’s patronage appointments and replace them with their 
own appointments (MacKinnon, 1973; Simpson, 1988). This remained the case for most of the 
twentieth century, though the increased professionalisation of the public service in later years, 
combined with a recent legal challenge of the mass layoff by an incoming administration, have 
reduced the extent of patronage (Buker, 2005; Govt.PEI v. Condon et al.., 2006; MacKinnon, 
2011; Simpson, 2007). McKenna (2014a) notes, for example, that there is no longer a 
wholesale replacement of Deputy Ministers during government transitions, though, citing 
Crossley (2000), he describes the current appointment practice as following “the principle of 
merit-plus-a-little-bit-of-patronage” (cited in McKenna, 2014a, p. 79).  As noted above, this 
particular practice remains in place (Neatby, 2019). Nonetheless, concerns about the 
persistence of patronage continue to be raised in the Legislature, as illustrated by recent 
debates: 
 
Since being elected, I have been approached by multiple individuals as well, as [sic] a 
wide range of organisations and businesses that are under the impression that I, as the 
MLA for the district, am the gatekeeper for gaining access to jobs through the 
[Employment Development Agency] … Clearly there are ethical concerns involved 
when individuals are under the impression that an MLA gave them a job, such that they 
may feel obligated to vote a certain way to gain or maintain employment (Altass, 2019, 
pp. 375-376). 
 
Finally, PEI has long had the highest voter turnout in Canada, though as suggested by 
Corbett & Veenendaal, this may be due in part to attempts by voters to secure their source of 
patronage (2018; Simpson, 2007). 
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Dimension 6: The capacity to dominate all aspects of public life 
 
This dimension is in a sense a culmination of the previous ones. Strong patronage 
networks can make it difficult to remove a politician or leader from power. Power tends to be 
concentrated due to the combination of an expanded public sphere and a lack of professional 
capacities. Weak institutional checks on executive power and a concentration of professional 
capacity in the bureaucracy (under executive control) allows the executive to dominate other 
parts of government and society. This is also connected to weak or partisan-controlled media 
(Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018). 
 
The weak institutional checks on executive power are exemplified by the role of the 
Legislative Assembly of PEI, which has been described as “little more than a rubber stamp” 
for the executive branch (MacKinnon, 2011, p. 16). Centralisation of power within the 
executive has been noted in the wider Canadian context (Savoie, 1999); but Buker (2005) 
argues that in the PEI context this may be driven more by the fact that most policy solutions 
require negotiation with the federal government, which creates a sense of solidarity within 
government as a whole. Executive domination is therefore not always coercive.  
 
National media outlets typically pay little to no attention to Prince Edward Island politics, 
to the point that the only one with any presence whatsoever in the province is the public 
broadcaster, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). At a provincial level, currently 
only three reporters regularly cover provincial politics, one for each of the CBC, Radio Canada 
(the francophone wing of the CBC), and Saltwire Network (which includes two local daily 
newspapers, the Guardian and the Journal Pioneer). Another publisher, the rural-focused Island 
Press (which includes two local weekly newspapers, the Eastern Graphic and the West Prince 
Graphic, as well as a couple of less frequent publications), does not have a regular political 
reporter but does feature regular opinion columns that frequently discuss provincial politics. 
The Saltwire and Island Press publications also feature active letter-to-the-editor sections in 
which political debates are common, and in which political leaders often participate. While in 
the past newspapers in PEI were explicitly partisan, often owned and actively managed by 
elected politicians, this has not been the case for some time (MacKinnon, 1973). Social media 
is also increasingly important in political communications in Canada (Marland, Giasson, & 
Small, 2014), which provides a new space in which this local tradition of active participation 
in political debate can flourish. In these circumstances, one could argue that the function of the 
formal news media to report on government and hold it accountable to the public are somewhat 
weak. However, this may be balanced to some degree by the active participation of the public 
in political debates.  
 
The concentration of professional capacity in the public sector is suggested by PEI’s 
higher proportion of workers employed in the public sector than the national average (Statistics 
Canada, 2018a) Along with the weak checks on power described above, this has allowed the 
development of a politics where a single monopoly elite can dominate policy decisions while 
simultaneously maintaining a “disarming influence” in respect to ordinary Islanders (Simpson, 
2007; Buker, 2005). This is further exemplified by the tendency of the provincial executive to 
implement policy decisions with minimal public input or accountability, even where public 
resistance may be encountered, leading to an “overwhelming dominance of the provincial state 
in PEI affairs” (McKenna, 2014b, p. 67).  
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Discussion 
 
In the section above, I have shown that all six dimensions of personalism attributable to 
small sovereign states are readily observed in the small province of Prince Edward Island, a 
subnational (non-sovereign) jurisdiction. In the rest of the paper, I discuss the implications of 
these findings in greater detail, starting with the potential effect of subnationality on 
personalism, then examining the potential of personalism theory for other subnational 
jurisdictions, and finally a brief exploration of the potential effect of the level of development 
and maturity of political institutions. 
 
An obvious question that arises from this research is whether personalism in PEI politics 
may be modified by its status as a subnational polity. Generally speaking, governance in PEI 
is significantly affected by the policies of other governments within Canada, both national and 
of other provinces and territories. Politicians and civil servants participate in various networks 
with their counterparts, both in other provinces and at the federal level. Accordingly, the 
diffusion theory of Canadian federalism describes “the tendency for governments in Canada to 
emulate each other ... whereby an institution, practice or policy that is pioneered and proven 
effective in one jurisdiction is frequently copied by other jurisdictions" (Hyson, 2005, p. 76). 
It could reasonably be argued that, due to lower human resource capacities, small jurisdictions 
might tend to follow the lead of larger ones, or at least to specialise in a limited number of 
policy areas. Additionally, politicians from all parties in PEI regularly switch between running 
provincially and federally (normally for the same party), creating additional provincial-national 
linkages at the party level. More directly, the federal government provides large amounts of 
fiscal aid to the provinces and territories in order to allow a similar level of service provision 
across the country, despite varying fiscal capacities (Government of Canada, 2019). PEI and 
other small provinces have generally been large recipients of this aid on a per-capita level 
which has led to a dependence on the federal government, though there is substantial debate 
about the nature of this dependency and what to do about it (Savoie, 2017). In any case, the 
simple fact that the PEI provincial government derives nearly 40 percent of its revenues from 
these federal transfers (Prince Edward Island, 2019) creates a strong vulnerability to federal 
policy shifts, as happened in the 1990s when the federal government cut transfer payments as 
part of its effort to balance the budget. The provincial response to this drop in federal revenues 
was to cut the wages of provincial civil servants, a move that likely precipitated a change in 
government (MacDonald, 2000; Cusack, 2013). Another striking example of the influence of 
national politics on PEI is the pattern documented by Stewart where provincial voters “elect 
provincial administrations of the same party stripe as the federal government” (1986, p. 127). 
While since the time of Stewart’s writing this pattern has broken down, it is nonetheless a clear 
indication that federal politics matter in PEI. The existence of this pattern may have been 
influenced by the province’s fiscal and policy dependence on Ottawa, and the perception that 
having a friendly government nationally would ensure the maintenance of transfer payments 
(Simpson, 1988).  
 
However, despite the large role that federal and even other provincial politics can play in 
PEI, this research was unable to find any direct indication that the personalistic character of 
PEI politics is significantly affected by this. As the analysis in the previous section showed, 
each of the dimensions of personalism are still observed in PEI. Admittedly, these practices are 
changing, in part due to external influences. For example, the instance cited above with regard 
to the creation of a provincial ombudsperson, an issue that has been raised multiple times in 
the last 25 years, shows that policies learned from the broader Canadian political system can 
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generate debate on the very nature of the relationship between politician and constituent. Such 
examples point to a potential path for external influences to enter PEI’s system (often framed 
as “best practices” that ought to be followed). The creation of a provincial ombudsperson, for 
instance, would likely have a significant impact on personalistic political practices, in particular 
the ubiquity of patronage and the strong connection between politicians and constituents. 
Ultimately, this paper points to subnationality, and the place-specific variations that it may 
bring (in particular when dealing with highly autonomous SNIJs that may have unique 
constitutional arrangements), as a potential factor that personalism theory may need to grapple 
with if it is to be applied to subnational polities. If the personalistic character of politics in small 
non-sovereign polities is indeed unaffected by subnationality, then a shift in focus beyond small 
states toward small polities within personalism theory may be in order. Indeed, closing this gap 
between small states and small polities (territories) is part of the mandate of Small States and 
Territories (Baldacchino, 2018). 
 
Randma-Liiv & Sarapuu (2019) point out that much of the literature on small polities is 
based on developing states, so that it is not always clear whether the particularities of their 
political systems are a consequence of their small size or their stage of democratic 
development. With its legislative assembly dating to 1773, and as part of one of the most highly 
developed countries in the world, PEI qualifies as a well-established and developed polity. 
However, the high level of personalism seen in PEI politics demonstrates that it is also highly 
affected by its small size. Furthermore, some aspects of personalistic politics appear to be more 
pronounced in PEI’s past. In particular, declining patronage and the gradual and ongoing 
professionalisation and formalisation of the provincial civil service suggest that PEI may be 
becoming less personalistic.  
      
Conversely, other factors may be contributing to an increase in personalism. Social 
media, in particular, provide a new medium for highly personalised connections and 
communications between politicians and constituents (Corbett & Veenendaal, 2018). They also 
offer new and effective forums for sharing political rumours and gossip, which play an 
important role in the everyday politics of small societies (Besnier, 2009). Furthermore, in larger 
jurisdictions, many politicians can delegate the management of their social media accounts to 
a staff person. However, the much more limited support staff available to politicians in small 
jurisdictions like PEI (MacKinnon, 2011) means that politicians in small polities are more 
likely to manage their social media accounts personally. These interactions can thus easily 
bypass formal institutional pathways, such as political parties or support staff, creating more 
direct and informal linkages between politicians and constituents. Given these points, it would 
seem that, rather than becoming less personalistic, PEI may be entering a new phase of 
personalistic politics. 
 
Accordingly, PEI’s more mature and developed political institutions may provide the 
basis for a variant of personalism; in other words, that personalism works slightly differently 
in developed and/or established democratic polities. Additional research to better describe 
PEI’s political institutions and to examine personalism in other established and developed 
small polities would be needed to test these hypotheses. My initial research here shows that 
personalism, and (by association) smallness, are indeed important factors in explaining 
governance in at least one developed small polity. 
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Conclusion 
 
This paper seeks to contribute to the development of personalism theory and the study of 
small states and polities. It has attempted to expand the scope of personalism theory beyond 
small states by analysing a case study of a small subnational jurisdiction, namely Prince 
Edward Island, a province of Canada. By evaluating PEI politics against each of the six 
dimensions of personalism, I conclude that PEI politics are indeed highly personalistic. The 
discussion then examined some of the broader implications of these findings. With respect to 
the effect of subnationality on personalism, this study does not find any convincing evidence 
to suggest that subnationality affects the personalistic character of politics in small subnational 
polities any differently than it does in small sovereign states. I suggest that there is indeed scope 
for the application of personalism theory to other subnational jurisdictions, which moreover 
points to the potential to expand small state studies to include small polities. The potential 
effect of development is briefly explored but found to be a less important factor than smallness 
in explaining governance in small polities.  
 
These findings, of course, are based on a case study of one: they are admittedly indicative 
and preliminary, while pointing to future research directions that may contribute to the 
development of small state (or small polity) studies. Additional case studies of politics and 
personalism in small subnational polities could help to reinforce, refine or refute the 
conclusions made in this paper. Additionally, comparative studies might be conducted to 
determine whether the level of autonomy, development, or other aspects of governance have 
any effect on personalism in small polities.  
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